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ABSTRACT
The Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) is gaining increasing interest for its potential
use as a hardware primitive in secure computing systems. In the most basic sense, a PUF is a
device that harnesses the natural entropy in a physical system. A delay-based PUF in particular
depends on the process variation that is inherent in the manufacturing of any integrated circuit.
A particular instance of an ideal PUF will consistently output a particular bit pattern. Each
instance of the exact same circuit, however, will produce a substantially different pattern. As
a result, having full knowledge of its design will not help an attacker to predict its output, nor
to successfully clone such a device.
For this research, a new PUF variant was developed on an FPGA, and an evaluation of its
quality is performed. It is conceptually similar to PUFs developed using standard SRAM cells,
except it utilizes general FPGA reconfigurable fabric, which offers several advantages. First,
it allows greater control over the position and arrangement of each PUF cell. This flexibility
increases our ability to study the various factors that impact a PUF’s performance. Second,
the PUFs can be reset without requiring the entire device to be reset, which is needed for
the application of error correction. Third, it becomes possible to access the output of a large
PUF array in parallel rather than word-by-word as in the case with standard SRAM. This can
decrease the time it takes to retrieve the PUF output.
A quantitative comparison between our approach and other recent PUF designs indicates
that our design is competitive in terms of repeatability within a given instance, and uniqueness
between instances. A single PUF cell consumes only a single FPGA Slice, and has very low
dynamic power dissipation, making it suitable for authentication applications on resource-
constrained embedded systems. However, the design can also be tuned to achieve desired
response characteristics which broadens the potential range of applications.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
A great deal of attention is traditionally given to the problem of securing computing systems
at the software level. Comparatively less is given to securing the hardware on which the software
runs. A Xilinx whitepaper [20] discusses a number of threats to hardware design.
• Reverse engineering involves a third party which examines a design (layout, components,
firmware) with the goal of reconstructing it for future development.
• Cloning involves less of a desire to understand a design; instead the attacker simply
intends to copy and resell a design, without incurring the overhead of development costs.
This is also referred to as counterfeiting.
• Overbuilding occurs when a subcontractor builds more units than have been ordered for
fabrication by an Original Equipment Manufacturer. The intent is to sell the units for
themselves. This is also a form of counterfeiting.
• Tampering occurs when an attacker attempts to gain unauthorized access to an electronic
system, such as an to modify its firmware.
Two major themes here are the theft of intellectual property and the production of coun-
terfeit components. Counterfeit components are not just a concern due to the increasing cost
burden they place on companies that design or supply integrated circuits. They are also a
potential threat to public safety, since counterfeit components are often produced from poorly
controlled processes or from discarded defective materials–a counterfeiting operation might be
quite successful simply re-marking and selling scrap components [25]. Components produced
in these ways are likely to cause the failure of the system in which they are used. In a recent
2example, it is suspected that the failure of the Russian Phobos-Grunt spacecraft was due to
counterfeit memory chips which were not sufficiently hardened against radiation [21].
Another theme is the ability of attacker to physically tamper with electronic hardware with
an intent to extract secret information. This can be done in a variety of ways. One method
is differential power analysis. Another is method is to chemically etch away the casing of
an integrated circuit and simply examine the die; a third is to induce instruction-flow faults
in a CPU by using clock glitches. The potential for these kinds of techniques to cheaply
extract RSA and DES secret keys from smart card memories has been recognized since at least
1997[4]. Of course today, extracting secret keys from smart cards is even easier–algorithms
such as COMP128-1 can be broken in just a few minutes with kits purchased cheaply online
[7]. This demonstrates the great challenge of ensuring security when an attacker has physical
access to a device.
Thus, the idea of the Physically Unclonable Function was born from the the need for
tamper-resistant, unclonable hardware [34]. Although absolute security has been shown time
and again to be an unreachable ideal, if properly implemented and integrated, PUFs have the
potential to offer a very high degree of security at very low cost.
1.1 Contributions
The main goal of this project is to explore the properties of the delay-based physically un-
clonable function, using a unique memory-type PUF that has been designed and implemented
on an FPGA. This new design is conceptually simple and consumes minimal FPGA resources.
The design is demonstrated using a variety of empirical tests to be suitable for hardware authen-
tication applications. The project applies Hardware Description Language (HDL) hard-macros
and an architecture-level understanding of the FPGA to ensure the accuracy and reliability of
test results.
31.2 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, a general description of Physically Un-
clonable Functions (PUFs) is provided, as well as a brief discussion of their major applications.
A discussion of the differences between ASICs and FPGAs, as far as PUF research is concered,
is also included here. Since this thesis is mainly concerned with the design of PUFs, in Chapter
2 a literary survey is presented which summarizes the major delay-based PUFs which have
been prosed to date. A commentary is also provided which places the PUF designed for this
thesis in context with the existing designs. Chapter 4 focuses on the design of the PUF created
during this project. Here the principles behind its operation are discussed at length. Chapter
5 describes the metrics that were applied and experimentation that was performed to evaluate
the performance of the PUF. It also includes a discussion of the applications for which it may
best be suited. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and discusses possible future efforts
related to the discoveries made in this thesis.
4CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
Research on PUFs and process variation has been gaining increasing interest since the
concept of the PUF was formally introduced by Pappu, et. al. in [34] in 2001. In the simplest
sense, a PUF is a device whose transfer function exploits physical phenomena in a way that
cannot be replicated, even if the full design is known. The PUF designs that have been
proposed over the years are diverse, ranging from Pappu’s original design, which relies on the
unpredictability of light refraction on a textured surface, to the delay-based silicon PUFs which
this paper focuses on.
At the behavioral level, a PUF is often thought of as a hardware version of a cryptographic
hash function. It is sometimes also referred to as a physical one-way hash function when
implemented in a challenge-response framework1. PUFs reduce the ability of attackers to
circumvent security mechanisms, as these mechanisms are implemented in tamper-resistant
hardware rather than at the software level. This property of tamper evidence has already been
demonstrated for optical PUFs [34] and coating PUFs [1].
Furthermore, the devices are conceptually unclonable in the sense that, although they may
be physically copied, this provides no advantage to an attacker, because each copy will behave
differently. PUF designs exist that consume very little power, meaning a high degree of security
can be applied to embedded applications with extremely limited resources, such as RFID cards.
2.1 Significance of Process Variation
The physical phenomena that underlie a PUF should be computationally difficult to model,
and this is no less true for the delay-based PUFs which concern this thesis. While sophis-
ticated models for modeling propagation delay in semiconductor devices exist, much of the
1described in Section 4.4
5process variation inherent in any manufacturing process can only be modeled as a statistical
distribution. These variations exist within a die, between dies, between wafers, and between
lots or production batches. These variations appear in the length and width of components
such as interconnects and discrete transistor features, as well as the thickness of oxide layers.
This variation exists for every property of a silicon device, any of which can have an impact on
the PUF’s output.
It is well-known that process variation is becoming harder and harder to control as feature
size shrinks. It has been shown that, at least between 90nm and 45nm processes, not only is
variation increasing but it is also becoming less systematic and more random, or stochastic [33].
These kinds of errors are caused by vibrations during manufacturing or nanometer-scale wafer
unevenness–they typically cannot be reduced by improving the process. In [35] ring oscillators
are used on a 90nm Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) to estimate the impact of process
variation on delay variation. In the study, the amount of variation is projected out to future
process nodes. The delay through a lookup table (LUT) was measured to have a mean variation
(3σ) of +/-3.5% . The authors projected that for 65nm this will increase to 4.5%, for 45nm
5.5% and 22nm 7.5%. The estimation for 45nm aligns well with the empirical study performed
in [33] in 2008, suggesting the projection may be quite accurate.
An interesting consequence is that one might expect that a given delay-based PUF circuit,
without any modification, will have increasing reliability at each new technology node–in some
sense piggybacking on Moore’s Law. Although modern FPGAs are available at various scale
nodes, it is unfortunately very difficult to demonstrate unequivocally that a design’s perfor-
mance has improved with scale. FPGA architectures are simply too different across device
families–there are many more variables involved than simply diminishing process scale. Thus
the idea is provided only as an unproven hypothesis.
2.2 PUF Applications
A few applications for PUFs have been proposed over the years, most with a strong security
focus. As more is learned about PUFs, and the phenomenon on which they are based, it is cer-
tain that the number of applications will expand. It is important to mention that the suitability
6of a PUF for a particular application significantly depends on the application requirements.
For example, applications related to secure communications must have very low error rates,
while applications for random number generators typically rely on much noisier responses.
2.2.1 Signature Generation
An array of individual PUF structures can be used to generate a unique signature for device
authentication. For these kinds of applications, the PUF can be used to identify physical objects
in the same way that biometrics can be used to identify people. The signature is tamper-
resistant and cannot be duplicated, as it has been generated dynamically from the physical
properties of the device in which it is embedded. This used in a variety of intellectual property
(IP) protection schemes.
The basic idea for IP protection is that each device’s unique ID can be enrolled in a database
by the manufacturer before it is released on the market. Then, even if a third party illicitly
obtains the full design of the hardware, they will still not be able to produce a device that
can be authenticated, since the signature is generated by processes that cannot be precisely
controlled during manufacture. This process is described in [36].
There is particular interest in applying PUFs’ ability to generate unique signatures to
enhancing the security of RFID authentication–just a few examples are [9, 5, 2]. PUFs are also
used in the symmetric-key authentication protocol proposed by [12]. Finally, PUFs are applied
to authentication of mobile sensor network nodes in [41]. The idea is to prevent an array of
attacks which are possible when physical access to a node is possible.
2.2.2 Cryptography
Another application is the generation of secrets for cryptography. The advantage of a PUF is
that these secrets do not have to be stored anywhere on the hardware, since they are generated
dynamically at device reset. This is especially interesting for embedded devices. An example of
a cryptographic application involves a mobile phone whose firmware must be decrypted on each
startup. The cryptographic key must somehow be stored securely. Solutions using nonvolatile
memory or volatile memory with a battery are vulnerable to physical attacks or side channel
7attacks. PUFs can reduce these vulnerabilities, since physically disassembling such a circuit
will destroy its delay characteristics and therefore change its output.
As far as secure communication is concerned, there are several RFID (Radio Frequency
Identification) authentication schemes proposed that intend to strongly reduce many of the
vulnerabilities in today’s RFID systems . These designs must be extremely efficient both in
energy and complexity since a typical RFID card may only offer a few thousand logic gates.
A proposed mutual-authentication scheme for RFID using PUFs appears in [22]. The work
in [8] uses a PUF’s output to encrypt the challenge-response pairs exchanged during RFID
communication.
In [16] SRAM PUFs are used to implement a PKI system to encrypt the transmission of a
bitstream to an FPGA. FPGA bitstream encryption is also performed in [15] using Anderson’s
PUF. Both of these kinds of PUFs are described in Section 3.
2.2.3 Random Number Generator
With some modification a PUF design can also be turned into a true, or cryptographically
secure, random number generator. True random number generators have been created by
exploiting D-Flip flop metastability [31], Ring Oscillators [39], and SRAM PUFs [38]. Ring
Oscillator PUFs and SRAM PUFs are discussed in Section 3.
In a similar way deterministic random bit generators (DRBG) can be created, such as in
[38]. DRBGs employ a deterministic algorithm to create pseudo-random numbers, but seed
it with the random signature generated by a PUF. As long as the seed remains secret, the
numbers that are generated are not predictable. This system can create large numbers of
random numbers very quickly.
2.3 PUFs and FPGAs
In the PUF literature, actual device implementation and testing is either done on an ASIC
(Application-Specific Integrated Circuit) or an FPGA (Field-Programmable Gate Array). FP-
GAs are invaluable to PUF research for several reasons, not least of which being related to
FPGA reconfigurability.
8• Experiments can be performed rapidly with the whole testbench loaded onto the same
hardware as the PUFs.
• The effects of small changes to routing and component placement can be verified quickly.
• A host of dedicated hardware components are already on-chip for testing, usually with
nominal delay characteristics provided by the manufacturer. These can usually be instan-
ciated in an HDL with little effort. Xilinx has documentation on all hardware elements
that can be instantiated, such as [40] for the Spartan 3E. This document was used exten-
sively for this project.
On the other hand, FPGA PUFs are more constrained than their ASIC counterparts.
• Routing is constraint to the resources provided on-chip. A good amount of control over
routing is possible using design constraints, but arbitrary routes cannot be generated.
When routing is tightly controlled, such as with the application of hard macros (used by
many PUF designs, including the one in this thesis), the automatically generated routes
may be significantly less optimal since they are blocked by the hard macro. In the worst
case large arrays of hard macros can cause the overall circuit to become unroutable.
• Placement of circuitry on-chip is constrained to discrete locations. What is more, usable
locations may not be distributed regularly across a die.
• Some dedicated hardware resources may simply be unavailable for experimentation. This
is especially the case for analog circuitry such as amplifiers or analog-to-digital converters.
• It is often difficult, if not impossible, to transfer a design between FPGA technologies due
to the large variation in available resources, coupled with the degree of low-level control
that is required. An example of such a resource variation is the number of inputs per
LUT.
Conceptually, FPGAs are primarily useful as vehicles for studying PUFs cheaply and at a
large scale. There are negative security implications for an FPGA-based PUF, since simply
relocating a PUF on a die can change its outcome. In fact, by trial and error one can induce any
9signature one desires. Furthermore it would not be difficult for a malicious party to add side-
channels to a design to capture and transmit the PUF signature. From a practical standpoint
and ASIC can be used to optimize an FPGA design. For these reasons, and reasons related to
design optimization, FPGA-based PUFs are more interesting for their potential for migration
to dedicated FPGA hardware, or migration to ASIC hardware.
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CHAPTER 3. LITERARY SURVEY
A variety of PUF designs have appeared over the past decade. In fact, in [29] it is noted
that a new PUF design has appeared roughly each year since 2000. A literary survey was
performed for this thesis to obtain a good idea of the state-of-the-art in PUF design. Several
of the more interesting designs are discussed briefly in this section. A more thorough survey
that includes some non-delay-type PUFs appears in [27].
3.1 SRAM PUF
An SRAM PUF is a kind of memory-based PUF. Memory-based PUFs exploits the un-
predictability of that the startup value of volatile memory cells, which is caused by slight
asymmetries in the cell’s internal routing and transistor characteristics. SRAM PUFs are quite
interesting in that they rely on commodity SRAM cells. In fact, after the PUF signature is
extracted it is possible to use the same cells as regular non-volatile memory. As an example,
SRAM PUFs have even been evaluated on a commodity microcontroller [6]. In that work a set
of criteria and metrics are proposed to determine whether an given SRAM can function as a
PUF.
In their raw, uncorrected state, this type of PUF suffers from a relatively high error rate.
Instability occurs when the internal cell layout is too symmetrical–it becomes susceptible to
environmental noise, temperature changes, and power supply transients. One proposed ap-
proach to combat unstable bits is to place more PUFs than needed, and add ADC circuitry to
automatically select the most stable ones [18]. Unfortunately, this approach is not practical for
FPGA-based studies since there is generally no flexible way to measure the analog aspect of an
internal signal. Another technique applies helper data algorithms to normalize the output [16].
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3.2 Butterfly PUF
Conceptually, the Butterfly PUF is somewhat similar to the SRAM PUF, in that they both
are memory cells whose startup value is hard to predict. However, it happens that FPGA
SRAM cells are all reset to a known state upon device reset. Therefore the Butterfly PUF was
developed in [23] as a way to enable the study of memory-type PUFs on an FPGA. It exploits
cross-coupled D Flip-Flops, shown in Figure 3.1.
Q
Q
SET
CLR
D
Q
Q
SET
CLR
D
clk
0
0
excite
output
clk
Figure 3.1: Butterfly PUF
Initially the ”excite” signal is raised high for a few clocks. Since the preset and clear pins
on the D Flip-Flops are asserted, and due to the cross-coupling of the outputs, the circuit is
held in an indeterminate, unstable state. When ”excite” is released, the circuit output will
resolve itself as either ’1’ or ’0’ based on the delay mismatch between the interconnects. In the
ideal case, in which the routes are totally symmetrical, this outcome is caused by the effect that
process variation has on the delay. The advantages of this design are that it uses only D- Flip
flops which are ubiquitous in FPGAs as well as in general design processes. One disadvantage
is that it requires extra care to route, due to the constraints of FPGA routing.
3.3 Ring Oscillator PUF
Generally PUFs based around design symmetry have been deemed less suited for imple-
mentation on FPGAs due to the limitations of routing [32]. This is one of the reasons for the
12
popularity of RO-based designs on FPGAs, since absolute symmetry is not necessary to create
an oscillator, and the error associated with making a single measurement is amortized across
many oscillator cycles. The ring oscillator (RO) is one of the earliest and mature classes of
delay-based silicon PUFs, first introduced in [13, 14]. A ring oscillator simply a loop of invert-
ers having an odd number of stages. The circuit will spontaneously begin to oscillate with a
frequency that can be determined from the delay of each inverter stage. A typical 5-stage RO
including an enable signal is shown in Figure 3.2.
Enable Output
Figure 3.2: Ring Oscillator With Enable
The RO PUF relies on the fact that any two rings will not oscillate at the exact same
frequency, even if they are laid out exactly the same. This is due to process variation which
impacts the delay of the signal propagating around the ring. A more recent RO PUF variant
affixes a counter to each RO, and compare the counts after a period of time, in pair-wise fashion
[37]. This ”differential” measurement has been shown to give better results than the basic RO
design. A typical RO PUF with such a configuration is shown in Figure 3.3. The example
produces a single response bit.
In [28] is performed the largest-scale analysis of RO behavior that is known to date, using
90nm FPGAs as test platforms. The study confirmed that the RO PUFs generated signatures
that were unique among different chips, and quite consistent within a given chip.
3.4 Arbiter PUF
The arbiter PUF is another well-studied design, published in 2004 [24]. In the general
sense, an arbiter PUF sets up a set of closely-matched race tracks with an arbiter at the end
to determine which signal reached the end first–typically this is a D Flip-Flop with one signal
attached to the clock pin and another attached to the data pin. The basic arbiter PUF design
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is shown in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Arbiter PUF
Although shown as multiplexers, the adjustable delay portion of the circuit is implemented
in different ways. In [30] LUTs are used to create extremely precise programmable delay lines.
A rigorous large-scale analysis of this kind of PUF is performed by [19]. In that work, it is
demonstrated that is quite feasible to make a fully-functional arbiter PUF on an FPGA, despite
the routing constraints. Interestingly these results fall contrary to the results of [32] which used
timing tools to conclude that FPGA routes could not be configured which are matched closely
enough. This discrepancy demonstrates the challenge of measuring process variation and the
importance of empirical study.
While arbiter PUFs have been shown quite good in terms of adhering to PUF properties,
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it has been shown that the basic form is vulnerable to model-building attacks [10]. Using
machine learning, after observing a sufficient number of sufficient challenge-response pairs, it
was possible to guess the outcome the PUF with 0.6% error rate. Subsequent designs add
additional complexity in order for the challenge to control the delays in a non-linear way. An
early attempt to introduce non-linearity is the feat-forward arbiter PUF [10]. Since then, there
have been several rounds of attack proposal followed by design modification.
3.5 Anderson PUF
The Anderson PUF [3] is quite unique in that it is the first PUF designed expressly for
implementation on FPGAs. Unlike many PUFs designed for FPGAs, it does not require hard
macros to control symmetry. Instead it uses the carry chain multiplexers present in certain
FPGA components. A simplified depiction of Anderson’s PUF is shown in Figure 3.5. Both
LUTs A and B are configured as shift registers, and initialized with bit strings that are inverses
of each other. Thus when clocked, the two LUTs output square waves that are 180 degrees
out of phase. The inputs to the LUTs are connected as necessary to perpetuate the output
pattern.
Due to process variation in the LUTs and the multiplexers that they control, the propagation
delay from the input to the output will vary from LUT to LUT. For some instantiations, the
LUT outputs will be sufficiently out of phase to produce a brief rising glitch at the output,
which can be captured by a flip-flop. The presence or absence of the glitch determines the
PUFs output bit.
3.6 Commentary
From a classification standpoint, the PUF designed for this thesis (described in Chapter
4) is a memory-type PUF, and therefore inherits similar properties. Compared to the designs
discussed thus far, the one proposed in this thesis:
• similar to the Butterfly PUF it uses general FPGA reconfigurable fabric, making testing
more convenient than for SRAM PUFs. The circuit can be reset arbitrarily without
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Figure 3.5: Anderson’s PUF
requiring the whole device to be reset. Furthermore the cells can be placed around the
IC arbitrarily which can make reverse engineering more difficult.
• is conceptually less complex than the non-linear Arbiter PUFs. Despite that, this kind
of circuit is (thus far) much less vulnerable to modeling attacks, since each cell behaves
independently of the others.
• intuitively has a lower power requirement than the RO PUF, since it does not oscillate.
On the other hand, a disadvantage of this kind of PUF is that the space that an n-bit
response requires at least n cells. If a large number of cells are needed, for example if extensive
error correction is applied, the area consumed could become fairly large. Additionally in their
raw form this kind of PUF tends to suffer from a slightly higher-than-average level of noisiness.
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CHAPTER 4. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 Design Goals
The broad goals of this design were threefold:
1. Minimize PUF area.
2. Minimize dynamic power consumption.
3. Minimize the evaluation time.
Ignoring error-correction, a memory-type PUF needs n cells to create an n-bit signature.
To accommodate longer signatures, it is desirable for each cell to be relatively small to improve
spacial efficiency. It is also important to recall that the PUF itself is only a small component
of a larger application. Most PUFs do require some kind of post-processing to correct for
irregularities in the PUF output. Both overall size and evaluation time are affected by the
complexity of the post-processing phase. Therefore it is also desirable for the PUF to adhere as
closely as possible to the the ideal PUF properties before any post-processing is applied. Then
the cost of post-processing can be minimized. Power consumption is a particularly an important
factor for resource constrained embedded applications such as RFID or sensor networks.
4.2 Principle of Operation
As described in Chapter 3, memory-type PUF uses a small cell whose contents cannot be
are not known until it has stabilized after reset. For example, in Figure 4.1, if both switches
are initially closed, then the capacitors at Q1 and Q2 are both to charged to logical 1. Then at
at t=0, the switches are opened and the circuit must resolve to a stable state which depends on
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the propagation delay through the inverter, the delay of the interconnects, and the switching
threshold of the logic. If Route R1 has a shorter delay, it will remain at logical 1 and force Q2
to logical 0. If Route R2 has a shorter delay, it will remain at logical 1 and force Q1 to logical
0. Thus Q1 and Q2 will always resolve to opposing values, but which has which value depends
on the physical properties of the device into which it is instantiated.
 
Q1 Q2
VDD
VDD
R
1
R
2
Figure 4.1: Conceptual design
The PUF designed for this thesis is shown in Figure 4.2. The switches are replaced by
combinational logic which is implemented in LUTs. Thus the multiplexer and inverter are
only displayed to demonstrate the LUT configuration. The D flip-flop is included because it
allows the internal reset lines to be routed locally. The local routing means the routes can be
conveniently included in the PUF hard macro so that reset skew will not be a variable across
instances.
4.3 Implementation Details
Although the design is quite simple, given the routing constraints of an FPGA, ensuring
symmetrical routing is still a challenge.Another problem is ensuring that each instance of the
circuit is identical. Neither of these requirements can be met by allowing the design tools to
place and route on their own.
The Xilinx toolset includes a tool called FPGA Editor that not only allows the physical
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placement and routing of a design to be verified, but also allows creation of what are known
as hard macros. Figure 4.3 shows a single PUF instance implemented as a hard macro on
a Spartan 3. Figure 4.4 shows a regular grid of such instances. There are no external routes
shown, such as the reset lines or the outputs, only the two local loops emerging from the SLICE
on the right, entering the switch matrix on the left, and then returning to the SLICE. These
two routes correspond to the nets Q1 and Q2 in Figure 4.2. The results in [35] suggest that
even the positions of CLB pins for signals not on the critical path should be consistent, as their
placement can have a small effect on the overall circuit delay. The combination of mapping
constraints and hard macros maintains pin placement across instances.
Conceptually the circuit delay can be broken down into two main parts. There is the fixed
delay of the design, and the uncertainty in delay due to the process variation. The concept is
portrayed in Figure 4.5.
The bias introduced by allowing the design tools to perform all routing is exemplified in
Figure 4.5a. The delay of the two critical routes, R1 and R2 are compared. The fixed design
delay is shown as the empty region, and the deviation due to process variation is shown as the
shaded region. It does not matter how much variation is there is, as the routing mismatch is too
great and therefore its effect dominates. This circuit will produce the same output regardless
of placement and is not suitable for most PUF applications.
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Figure 4.3: PUF layout in FPGA Editor
The use of hard macros to constrain routing of the critical signals is exemplified in Figure
4.5b. The delay bias is caused by the uncertainty of process variation. The greater the process
variation, the better chance that the relative delay will be strongly biased, and therefore always
produce ’0’ or ’1’.
Finally, the comparison in Figure 4.5c also has closely-matched route delays–however, the
delay variation is quite small and therefore the circuit may be unstable in the face of varying
environmental conditions such as thermal noise, supply voltage as well as the switching activity
of nearby circuits. A PUF whose routes happen to be too closely matched may show random
inconsistencies in its output. Thus greater variation is desirable as it reduces the possibility
that these effects can temporarily bias the circuit one way or the other.
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Figure 4.4: Portion of 128 cell PUF Array
The function of the PUF can be described a bit more formally. The following equation
shows the delay of a net dN . dS represents the static delay that is estimated by the design
tool. On the other hand, dR is a random variable representing the uncertainty in net delay due
to process variation. Finally dNOISE is a dynamic random variable representing the effects of
temperature and voltage variation as well as interaction between circuits. Both dR and dNOISE
may be either negative or positive quantities.
dN = dS + dR + dNOISE (4.1)
Next, we can model the characterize the delay of the two nets, Q1 and Q2. Both dL1
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Figure 4.5: Delay Model
and dL2 are additional random variables representing the delay through the two LUTs that
are employed by the design to create the necessary logic. They are always positive. As an
example, the Spartan3E datasheet lists a maximum propagation delay of around 0.66ns to-
0.76ns depending on speed grade.
dq1 = dL1 + (dSq1 + dRq1 + dNOISEq1) (4.2)
dq2 = dL2 + (dSq2 + dSq2 + dNOISEq2) (4.3)
Ideally the quantity ∆dS = (dSq1 − dSq2) should be zero so that the effect of the random
LUT and route delay components dominate. The difference between the delay of the routes,
∆d, dictates the circuit outcome for a given evaluation.
∆d = (dL1−dL2)+(dSq1−dSq1)+(dRq1−dRq2)+(dNOISEq1−dNOISEq2) = ∆dL+∆dS+∆dR+∆dNOISE
(4.4)
Finally, the PUF can be described by a pair of piecewise functions depending on ∆d. This
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equation is validated in Section 5.2.
Q1 =

1 : ∆d < 0
0 : ∆d > 0
(4.5a)
Q2 =

1 : ∆d > 0
0 : ∆d < 0
(4.5b)
Notice that these functions are not completely defined. If ∆dR is zero, or close to it, Q1 and
Q2 essentially become random variables due to the dynamic ∆dNOISE term. This is results in
metastability, stressing the importance of minimizing the static route skew.
A few desirable properties can be deduced from this analysis.
1. ∆dS should be as close to 0 as possible.
2. dNOISEshould be as close to 0 as possible.
3. dR  dS and dR  dNOISE to maximize reliability
4.4 Challenge-Response Framework
At the application level, PUFs are quite often integrated into a challenge-response frame-
work, and it is what makes them useful in authentication applications. This is primarily why
PUFs are referred to as functions. A PUF challenge is a bit string that is offered as input,
which the PUF’s output depends on–broadly speaking it behaves quite like a hashing function.
The PUF design in this section represents a single bit generator. It can be arranged as an
array to produce an arbitrary number of bits. In order to adapt such an array into challenge-
response system, one of the easiest modifications is to add comparison. A commonly proposed
circuit is a set of wide multiplexers which perform a pairwise comparison of the generated
signature bits, based upon the challenge.
This thesis focuses on the PUF design itself; such a higher-level construct is left to future
work.
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CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTATION AND EVALUATION
5.1 PUF Properties
In recent years there have been greater efforts to standardize the terminology used to
describe PUF properties and the metrics used to evaluate them. An example is [29] which
attempts to classify and summarize the terminology and evaluation techniques used by [19]
and others. This paper attempts to use such terminology where applicable to better facilitate
comparisons between designs. It should be noted, however, that there is still not full consensus
on what the full list of properties should look like. The four used in this thesis appear below.
• Reliability: the output of the PUF should be consistent.
• Uniformity: there should be an equal distribution of 1’s and 0’s in the output. This is
also called randomness in [19].
• Uniqueness: For two instances of the PUF structure, the responses to the same challenge
should be substantially different. This is necessary for the creation of many unique keys
or signatures.
Many other properties are defined by other authors. Based on the fact that this PUF is a
memory-type PUF, the selected property, borrowed from [6], is shown:
• Intra-die correlation: the bits of the response vector should be uncorrelated.
These properties are validated in the following sections.
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Configuration Q1 Delay (ns) Q2 Delay (ns) Skew (ns) Uniformity (%) HDINTRA (%)
a1b1 0.694 0.414 0.28 100 0
a1b2 0.444 0.373 0.071 18.8 11.4
a1b3 0.463 0.02 0.443 100 0
a2b1 0.066 0.414 -0.348 0 0
a2b2 0.066 0.373 -0.307 0 0
a2b3 0.066 0.02 0.046 17.6 11.7
a3b1 0.329 0.414 -0.085 0.1 0.1
a3b2 0.329 0.373 -0.044 0.1 0.1
a3b3 0.329 0.02 0.309 100 0
Table 5.1: Effect of Routing Skew on HDINTRA and Uniformity
5.2 Effect of Routing Skew
An experiment was performed on a Spartan3E to attempt to confirm the equations described
in Section 4.3, particularly Equation 4.7. The same PUF design was used as described in Section
4, but the lengths of the routes Q1 and Q2 were adjusted. This was done by changing the LUT
pins that were used at the source code level, portrayed graphically in Figure 5.2. Since the pins
of the reset lines were kept fixed, and each LUT has 4 inputs, a total of 9 routing configurations
were left. The thus-configured PUFs were read 100 times each to obtain each data point. There
results are shown in Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1.
The skew values shown were calculated from the static delay analysis tool, and the values
for HDINTRA and Uniformity in Figure 5.1 were gathered empirically.
The apparent systematic offset from 0ns in Figure 5.1 may exist for two reasons. First,
there could be a systematic error in the static timing analysis (ie, wrong speed grade selected).
Second, as reported by the timing tool, there does exist a small fixed skew on the reset lines
for each configuration, which will create a small bias in the response.
The data that was gathered appears to confirm the assumptions made in the delay model
described in Section 4. It is evident from the data that HDINTRA and Uniformity are coupled–
it is not particularly easy to optimize both. For example, looking at Table 5.1, configuration
”a1b1” achieves an error rate of 0%, but at the cost of a total bias towards generating 1’s.
Configuration ”a2b2” achieves a0% error rate with a total bias towards generating 0’s. Con-
figuration ”a2b2” was used in subsequent sections. It may not be the optimal configuration,
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(a) Although the amount of available data is quite small, HDINTRA (ie, the error rate)
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the assumption that noise effects tend to dominate under such conditions. Outside of
this region the error rate is zero since the response is fixed.
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(b) As the skew increases, the Uniformity saturates at 100% (1’s dominate) or 0% (0’s
dominate).
Figure 5.1: Effect of Routing Skew on HDINTRA and Uniformity
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(a) As described in Section 4, two LUTs are used
to create a combinational loop, both implementing
the same function. The skew between X and Y is
simply the difference of the delays.
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(b) The two LUTs are still implementing the same
function, but one LUT has a different pin selection.
As a result of FPGA routing constraints, the skew
(and thus circuit behavior) may be radically differ-
ent from (a), even though the logic is the same.
Figure 5.2: Effect of LUT Input Selection on Route Skew
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but an exhaustive search through the full set of pin permutations was not possible due to
time constraints. Future work might attempt to automate this process of finding the optimal
solution.
This experiment demonstrates the degree of impact that tiny changes in routing can have
on PUF behavior, and the small window of allowable routing skew for which the circuit will
function as a PUF.
5.3 Error Correction
Similar to biometrics, PUFs typically require some form of error correction to increase
reliability. Various error-correction schemes have been proposed to stabilize the output of
PUFs. A very simple scheme that requires minimal hardware is the majority vote. Two forms
are known as temporal majority voting, and spatial majority voting [26]. These techniques are
used to increase the reliability and uniformity of our PUF’s output.
Temporal majority voting (TMV) is also sometimes referred to as the repetition code. It
involves making an odd-numbered NT readings of the PUF, and then determining how many
1’s were read. If more than MT =
NT−1
2 1’s are read, the output is considered a 1. In some
sense this acts as a low-pass filter that is especially useful for PUF bits that occasionally toggle.
Thus, it improves the reliability, but at the expense of the process taking NT times longer.
Spatial majority voting (SMV) involves logically grouping small sets of NS PUFs for the
purpose of generating a single bit. Each PUF in a group produces a bit in parallel, and if
the number of 1’s produced exceeds MS then the overall group is considered to have produced
a 1. This form of majority voting helps to move the distribution of 1’s and 0’s in a string
to uniformity. Of course, like TMV, there is a trade off in that NS times as many cells are
required.
The post-processing that is applied in the following sections below first applies TMV with
NT = 3 and MT = 1, and then applies SMV with NS = 2 and MS = 0 . These values were
determined experimentally to show an improvement in both Repeatability and Uniformity, at
the cost of requiring 3 times as many readings, and 2 times as many cells, as the raw PUF
circuit.
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Another method of error correction which can correct noisy and non-uniform key data uses
a so-called fuzzy extractor as described in [11] and applied to PUF technology in [26] . This
method, however, is rather more complex and an examination of its effect on this particular
circuit is left to future work.
5.4 Suitability as a PUF
A circuit needs to be thoroughly tested before it can be deemed suitable as a PUF. Although
these devices can be simulated to a certain extent, due to the increasingly unpredictable prop-
erties of process variation, on-chip testing is more accurate.
Each of three Spartan3E FPGAs was divided into 8 regions in which the PUF is tested.
The regions are shown in Figure 5.3. It has been shown that interchip variation is at least as
great as intrachip variation[24], so the lack of distinction between the two in the analysis that
follows is acceptable.
In the discussion that follows, HD stands for Hamming Distance, which is simply the total
number of bits that differ between two bit vectors. Hamming Distance is a very common metric
applied in PUF evaluation.
5.4.1 Reliability
The ideal PUF should exhibit perfectly consistent, or reliable, behavior for a given instance.
In other words, it should always output the same value under any operating condition. The
extent to which a PUF deviates from this property can be called its error rate. A simple way
to express the error rate, as defined by [6], calculates the average intra-chip Hamming Distance
between a series of samples, for a particular PUF instance i. A baseline n-bit response Ri is
extracted from the circuit, and compared to m further samples. The expression to obtain a
single value based on a set of intra-chip HD1 calculations is shown below.
HDINTRA =
1
m
m∑
t=1
HD(Ri, R
′
i,t)
n
× 100% (5.1)
1This value is sometimes referred to as µintra
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Figure 5.3: Placement Regions Defined on Spartan3E
For this experiment, m, the number of repetitions, is 100. Table 5.2 shows the experiment
results. In the ideal case this value is 0%. The raw results show a relatively high error rate,
which is typical for SRAM PUFs [6]. With the application of lightweight post-processing the
error rate is improved.
5.4.2 Uniformity
Another metric is the uniformity of the PUF response. It is so-named because there should
be a uniform probability distribution of ’0’s and ’1’s in a given response r for circuit instance
i. It is effectively the mean value of an n-bit response, and can be expressed as follows.
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Instance HDINTRARaw HDINTRA Post-processed
1.1 12.2 4.4
1.2 11.3 4.2
1.3 15 5.2
1.4 13.2 8.7
1.5 15 5.3
1.6 13.4 8.9
1.7 14 5.9
1.8 13.9 4.7
2.1 12.7 6.2
2.2 11.3 10.4
2.3 14.9 8.3
2.4 11.9 1.7
2.5 14.2 2.5
2.6 13.5 5
2.7 13.6 8.9
2.8 11.7 5.3
3.1 6.9 7.3
3.2 10.7 8.6
3.3 15.2 8.8
3.4 9.3 9.2
3.5 10.6 8
3.6 14.2 7.1
3.7 16.3 12.7
3.8 14 3.2
Average 12.9 6.8
Table 5.2: Design Reliability
Ui =
1
n
n∑
l=1
ri,l × 100% (5.2)
An ideal PUF would show a uniformity of 50%. Since the PUF error rates are non-zero, the
Uniformity is averaged over 100 responses. The results of this experiment are shown in Table
5.3. For the raw circuit, the Uniformity is quite low suggesting a strong preference towards
producing 0’s. After post-processing, the output is closer to uniformity, with a small bias
towards producing 1’s.
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Instance Ui Ui Post-processed
1.1 20.4 59.5
1.2 16.2 48.5
1.3 23.8 63.5
1.4 21.9 56.9
1.5 26.6 67.4
1.6 24.2 58.1
1.7 22.3 60.6
1.8 23.6 66.5
2.1 23 57.8
2.2 19.9 52.7
2.3 25.2 62.7
2.4 26.3 61
2.5 24.7 60
2.6 23.9 59
2.7 26.3 60
2.8 24.3 59
3.1 9.4 31.8
3.2 17.6 44.7
3.3 15.1 46
3.4 13.9 39
3.5 15.5 43
3.6 24.6 59
3.7 22.4 60
3.8 23.7 66
Average 21.5 55.8
Table 5.3: Design Uniformity
5.4.3 Uniqueness
The uniqueness property of a PUF is the correlation between chips. A PUF duplicated
on another chip should produce a signature with a Hamming Distance of around 50%, which
means half the bits are different.
The following equation can be applied to determine the uniqueness of a PUF across a
population of k chips using pairwise calculations of HD, called HDinter
2.
Uniqueness =
2
k(k − 1)
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
HD(Ri, Rj)
n
× 100% (5.3)
2This value is sometimes referred to as µinter
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For this experiment, first pairwise comparisons are performed to determine the HD between
all circuit instances. Table 5.4 compares the Raw and Post-processed Uniqueness values for
the entire population. It is evident that reducing the error rate significantly improved the
Uniqueness of the PUF response.
Raw Postproccessed
34.2 47.8
Table 5.4: Design Uniqueness
In Figure 5.4 is shown a comparison of the histogram of HDINTER before and after post-
processing. It is clear that the histogram has been shifted closer to the ideal 50% average
HD.
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Figure 5.4: Raw HDInter vs Postprocessed HDInter
In Figure 5.5, the histograms of HDINTER and HDINTRA are directly compared. The fact
that they do not overlap is perhaps the most significant result of this thesis–it indicates that
with in this population of 24 PUFs it is possible to distinguish between a given PUF’s noisy
response, and the response of other PUFs. This means it is possible to implement a detection
algorithm to identify a given device. We can also estimate the minimum number of unique IDs
33
that could be generated based on the test results. The lowest HDINTER that was observed was
22%, suggesting that in such a case around 28 bits were different between the two signatures.
The number of IDs whose HD is 28 from a reference ID is 128 choose 28, or around 1.3× 1028.
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Figure 5.5: HDInter vs HDIntra
5.4.4 Correlation Between Bits
The autocorrelation test presented by [6] can be used to detect correlation between bits.
If there is any systematic or stochastic element to the process variation, it may show up as a
significant correlation at particular intervals. Because the signature bits are extracted from a
common fabric it is possible for spatial correlation to appear due to gradients–the existence of
which is demonstrated in [35]. Other factors that might cause correlation include the physical
layout of the individual cells, or interaction between circuit elements
The autocorrelation equation used to measure this is shown below.
Rxx(j) =
n∑
t=1
xtxt−j (5.4)
For this experiment, as with the others, the relative configuration of the cells is maintained
across all tests. A signature sample was taken from each device, and the autocorrelation test
34
was performed. The 0’s in each signature were replaced by -1, so that a correlation value of 0
indicates no correlation, and the values 1 and -1 indicate total correlation. Figure 5.6 shows
the experiment results.
As expected, the autocorrelation for interval length 0 is 1 for each device, since each bit
is totally correlated to itself. Although there are a few outliers, the results show no strong
correlation patterns between the three devices, suggesting that the physical configuration of the
cells does not have a strong impact on the resulting signature. This may appear to contradict
the results in [6], but it must be recalled that the array used in that experiment is much larger,
so the effect of systematic process variation must be more pronounced.
5.5 Environmental effects
The delay of a circuit is a function of ambient temperature. Although the effect depends on
the material, generally the higher the operating temperature of a digital circuit, the greater the
propagation delay along interconnects and through semiconductor devices. Thus for all delay-
based PUFs, ensuring output stability across a wide operational range is critical. Compared
to room-temperature measurements, the error rate of a typical PUF will increase by a few
percent as temperature is varied over a wide operational range, such as -40C to +85C which is
standard for testing ICs. Variation in supply voltage is another commonly-considered factor. It
is expected that this design will exhibit similar behavior in the face of environmental variation,
but such testing is left to future work.
5.6 Performance Comparison
Although the fairly widespread use of measuring Hamming Distance between device re-
sponses and within a device’s responses helps to provide benchmarks for comparing PUF de-
signs, due to the wide variety of testing procedures and sample sizes it is still quite difficult
to make direct comparisons between designs. Furthermore, some authors report results in the
raw PUF form only, while others only report the results with post-processing applied. Finally,
this design has yet to be integrated into a Challenge-Response Framework. Made of the other
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(a) Autocorrelation for device 1.
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(b) Autocorrelation for device 2.
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(c) Autocorrelation for device 3.
Figure 5.6: Comparison of 128-bit Signature Autocorrelation for three Spartan3E devices.
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PUF Experiment Reliability Uniqueness
Proposed 24 128-bit arrays (3072 cells) 6.8% 47.8%
Optical [34] 567 CRPs on 4 tokens 25.25% 49.79%
Coating [1] 31 CRPs on 36 ASICs < 5% ∼50%
Basic Arbiter [24] 10000 CRPs on 37 ASICs < 5% 50%
Feed-forward Arbiter [24] 10000 CRPs on 37 ASICs 9.8% 38%
Basic Ring Oscillator [13, 14] many CRPs on 4 FPGAs ∼0.01% ∼1%
Ring Oscillator with comparator[37] 1024 loops on 15 FPGAs 0.48% 46.14%
SRAM [17] 65440 CRPs on different FPGAs <12% 49.97%
Butterfly[23] 64 CRPs on 36 FPGAs <6% ∼50%
Anderson[3] 36 128-bit arrays 3.6% ∼48%
Table 5.5: Performance Comparison
works perform experiments based from the perspective of Challenge-Response Pairs (CRP).
With these caveats in mind, Table 5.5 is provided as only a reference point demonstrating that
the design proposed in this thesis is indeed competitive. It is also worth mentioning that the
design still has room for optimization, since a comprehensive examination of the effect of LUT
pin choice on Uniqueness and Reliability was not performed.
5.7 Design Applicability
PUF applications related to secret-key generation in cryptography require absolute repeatability–
the error rate should be very close to 0. On the other hand, applications related to authentica-
tion and signature generation are more tolerant to errors. A fuzzy acceptance mechanism can
be used to distinguish between a device’s noisy signature, and the signature of other devices.
This particular design would be best relegated to such an application. In particular the low
power consumption and relatively small footprint makes it suitable for embedded applications
such RFID authentication systems.
Another potentially interesting application, which is only mentioned in brief, is a random
number generator. As discussed in [22] a linear-feedback shift register (LFSR) can be added
to a PUF, using it as a seed. It is possible that the relative noisiness of the raw design can be
leveraged in such a way. For example, the LUT pin configurations could be tuned to achieve
good uniformity but high error rate.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
An exploration of ways to increase circuit reliability before any postprocessing is applied is
an important next step. This might involve further testing on the effects of cell layout, as well
as a more exhaustive exploration on the effect of permuting the pin arrangement on the LUTs
of a cell.
A number of qualitative tests can yet be performed on the PUF design presented in this
paper. For example, the actual settling time of the circuit would be an interesting bit of
information to determine the maximum sampling rate. Further tests related to durability must
be performed, such as design behavior in the presence of varying operating voltage, as well as
device aging, have yet to be performed.
Finally, future work should also see a shift in focus to the integration and testing of the
design in higher-level applications, such as the basic challenge-response framework, or an au-
thentication scheme. The ability to adjust the relative lengths of the PUF routing is a unique
asset in that it can potentially be used to optimize the circuit for different applications.
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